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TYPING AFTER SYNTAX. AN ARGUMENT FROM 







The paper, assuming the general framework of Chomsky’s (2013a, 2015b) current version 
of the Minimalist syntax, investigates the syntax of quotation in light of ellipsis. I show 
that certain unexpected effects arising for quotational ellipsis are problematic for the 
standard feature valuation system and, especially, for the theory of phases. I discuss some 
effects of two possible interpretations of such ellipsis, as well as a constraint following 
from deviant antecedents, to show that the standard view on the internal syntax of 
quotational expressions should be reconsidered. The paper offers a new view on feature 
valuation, as well as the connection between the Narrow Syntax and the C-I interface, 
defined in terms of recursive typing taking place at the interface. 
 





Within the everlasting discussion on the sense and various faces of the 
grammatical atomicity/complexity (cf. Jackendoff and Wittenberg, 2014; 
Trotzke and Zwart, 2014; and references therein for an overall discussion), 
quotation definitely deserves a prominent position. There are few phenomena in 
natural languages that pose such serious problems in this regard, idioms being 
probably one of the most explored areas (cf. Mateu and Espinal, 2007, 2010; 
Harwood et al., 2016; Ingason et al., 2016), much better than quotation. 
However, a quick look at the data shows that the problem is apparent and 
puzzling. To illustrate, take (1) and (2) below: 
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a. Peter said ‘London is a nice city.’. 
b. Peter said ‘The capital of England is a nice city.’. 
 
(2) 
a. Peter said that he should study math. 
b. Peter said ‘I should study math.’. 
c. What did Peter say he should study what? 
d. *What did Peter say ‘I should study what.’? 
 
While it is clear that both (1) and (2) deliver arguments in favour of treating 
quotations as atoms, it is worth pointing out that the quotattional expressions in 
each of the two is atomic in a different sense. Or rather, to put things more 
precisely, there are two distinct elements of the theory of syntax – Merge and 
phases – that seem to be vulnerable to each of the effects illustrated above. On 
the one hand, (1) with (a-b) being pairwise non-equivalent, shows that quotation 
is not straightforwardly compositional. This means that, contrary to the standard 
assumption maintained in Chomsky (2015b), it is not the case that each 
application of Merge is compositionally computable at the C-I interface. If this is 
so, however, then Merge loses one of its crucial properties, most recently given a 
new life in the context of Chomsky’s (2014a) Thesis T taking language to be 
optimized solely for C-I. On the other hand, as shown in (2), pure quotation is an 
island for movement, contrary to indirect speech. However, as pointed out in 
Boeckx (2012), having dispensed with the notion of barriers (cf. Chomsky, 
1986; and much related work), phases are the only way of accounting for 
islandhood. If this reasoning is on the right track, then the above examples show 
that quotation should be treated as atomic in two senses. First, it should be an 
atomic input to the formal semantic computation, and thus an atomic syntactic 
object (SO). Second, it should be atomic in terms of phases, corresponding to a 
phase complement. 
These preliminary observations have their counterpart in the rich tradition of 
formal accounts of quotation (cf. Cappelen and Lepore, 2007; Saka, 2013; Maier 
2014b, for critical overviews). Indeed, while highly diversified with respect to 
technical and conceptual details, in the philosophical tradition of the theory of 
quotation the atomic treatment of such expressions was almost universally 
assumed. Tarski (1933: 159) explicitly states that what he calls ‘quotation-mark 
names’1 are ‘syntactically simple expressions’. According to Geach (1957) a 
quotational name ‘dogs’ is equivalent to the phonological string formed by 
                                                          
1  Thanks for an anonymous reviewer for bringing to my attention Tarski’s explicit statement 
that quotes are, according to him, names in the logical sense of this word, not just expressions. 
Further non-trivial assumptions, again suggested by the reviewer and concerning the variable-
constant distinction for quotation, were pointed out by Soames (1999). However, the following 
discussion shows that this kind of approach is problematic on empirical grounds. 
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subsequent letters (d, o, g, s), all the morpho-syntactic features (e.g. [+PLURAL]) 
being blacked-out for the computation. Finally, in his especially influential 
demonstrative theory, Davidson (1979) takes quotation to be a whole that 
demonstrates an expression by providing its particular token. Again, the special 
act of reference provided by demonstration is clearly distinct from the standard 
procedure, where syntactic features and dependencies among them are mapped 
onto semantic functions. 
What is especially interesting, however, is that while all the above theories 
assume the atomic character of quotation, hardly any of them explains how 
atomic they are. Put differently, subsequent theories simply take a quotational 
expression to bear its referential properties only when taken as a whole. Still, 
none of them provides a formal framework stating what actually is the relation 
or category at hand that does not allow any partition of quotation. However, 
bearing in mind the well-known methodological point from natural science that 
atomicity/complexity is not a feature of any object, but of the formal account of 
this object construed within a given apparatus, the problem is by no means 
trivial. Thus the character of quotation can be different, depending not only on 
the particular grammar used for the analysis, but also on the level of analysis and 
the particular part of grammar being used at a given stage of computation. 
It is the main aim of the present paper to investigate the type of 
atomicity/complexity quotations actually represent. I am going to show that 
quotational ellipses put the problem of atomicity of quotation in a new light. 
They show not only that quotations that must indeed be atomic in some sense are 
simultaneously complex in another. They show that their complexity as such has 
at least two faces. I will focus on ellipses where complexity, though apparently 
syntactic, turns out to have much more serious repercussions at the semantic 
interface. Crucially, it seems to affect force understood as a mode of assertion. 
At first sight, this seems to be an argument in favour of taking the complexity of 
quotation to be essentially semantic. However, I argue that the empirical 
demands of quotation together with conceptually well-argued Minimalist 
assumptions show that the source of complexity is not an interface effect. This, 
as I show, motivates a more fine-grained approach to typing, working in a 
perfectly recursive fashion. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 I shortly discuss some 
challenging effects observable in the syntactic analysis of quotation. I focus on 
one interesting effect of double interpretation arising for the quotational ellipsis, 
as well as a technical problem with deriving quotational expressions. In section 3 
I show a puzzling problem that comes into play for quotational ellipses having 
their antecedents in quoted deviant expressions. In section 4 I propose a new 
way of approaching feature valuation and its connection with the semantic 
interface, defined in terms of typing. Section 5 summarizes the paper. 
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2. Ellipsis, syntax and double interpretation: some problems 
 
In this section I am going to have a closer look at some empirical data showing 
how quotational ellipsis can be problematic from the point of view of 
formulating their grammatical complexity. In particular, I will focus on the way 
the syntactic complexity affects the quoting material which, for good reasons, 
should be treated as an atom. In subsection 2.1 I sketch the problem showing the 
nature of syntactic/semantic complexity arising in the context of ellipsis. Then, 
in subsection 2.2, I discuss how these data are problematic for the standard 
Minimalist Program. It is argued that the atomicity/complexity of quotation 
looks differently at subsequent levels of computation, posing a serious challenge 
to the general architecture of grammar. 
 
2.1. The necessity of double interpretation  
 
Before moving to the technical part of the paper, let us first have a look at the 
problem arising for quotational ellipsis that is especially interesting in the 
context of the present discussion. The very problem of quotational ellipsis, 
though hardly explored in the recent research, is not new, dating back to Partee 
(1973; see also Wiese, 1996; and Maier, 2008, for some comments). The 
original observation was that quotations allow ellipsis as in (3) below, Δ 
standing for the ellipsis site:  
 
(3) 
Peter said ‘London is nice.’, but I think it is not Δ. 
Δ = nice 
 
If this is so, then the quoting inside (the material flanked by quotes) must remain 
syntactically transparent, and thus automatically non-atomic. Otherwise the 
system would not be able to reconstruct the ellipsis site. 
Though the above simple example is itself puzzling for the general syntactic 
discussion, it does not tell us much about the non-trivial character of the very 
notion of grammatical atomicity/complexity. What it shows is just that while 
semantically atomic, syntactically the quoting inside must be treated as complex, 
with all the projections accessible for computation. Still, this phenomenon is by 
no means new. Various kinds of syntactic complexity combined with semantic 
atomicity have been discussed in many contexts and analysed by means of 
different tools (cf. Larson, [2011] and his way of semantic adaptation of phases, 
interestingly taken into account in Chomsky [2013a: ft. 23], or Gallego’s [2016] 
account of reprojection enabling the derivation of lexical items). However, 
quotational ellipses are much more challenging. What is crucial here is that even 
in the case of such a simple example as (3), a closer look shows that an 
important detail has been omitted. Actually, Δ should have at least two possible 
values: Δ1 = nice and Δ2 = ‘nice’. For the former, the reconstruction of the elided 
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part yields an extensional expression picking out what is standardly denoted by 
the lexical entry nice. By contrast, in the latter the reconstructed material picks 
out the reference of the quotational expression ‘nice’ as used by its (overtly or 
contextually) salient speaker. That the distinction is by no means trivial can be 
seen more clearly in the following example: 
 
(4) Scenario: Tarski uses the adjective smart to describe only those persons who are 
good mathematicians and have made a substantial fortune. 
 Tarski said ‘Peter is smart.’, but I’m not sure whether he really is Δ. 
 Δ1 = smart; Δ2 = ‘smart’ 
 
Note that there is a substantial difference between the two2 ways of 
reconstructing Δ. While for Δ1 the speaker simply casts doubts on whether Peter 
is smart, for Δ2 she casts doubts on whether Peter is smart in the sense of 
Tarski’s use of smart. That is, she questions the fact that Peter is a good 
mathematician and, in the same time, that he has made a substantial fortune. The 
two readings3 result in two different lambda terms formulated at the semantic 






λei.λxe.f(x,e) & f is a feature meaning what the speaker S meant  
by smart & Tarski(S) 
 
At first sight, this resembles the well-known problem of attitudes within 
reporting clauses (cf. Tiskin, 2015, for some recent comments and overviews). 
However, a closer look shows that the problem is dramatically different. 
Contrary to the standard problems arising for de re/de dicto reports, the present 
problem hinges on the special syntax of quotation. In particular, it is its syntactic 
structure that must provide two readings: one for the non-quotational, another 
for quotational reading of ellipsis targeting quotation, a fact pointed out already 
in Parsons (1982)4. The point is that in the standard approach the proper reading 
is obtained thanks to an especially rich syntactic representation, with the whole 
bunch of operators and modifiers assumed to be present either in the derivation 
or within the semantic interpretation. However, as I will try to show in the next 
                                                          
2  I leave aside the third possible reading where Δ3 = ‘smart’ is used in the sense of some third 
contextually salient speaker. 
3  The formal account of the denotation of quotation is in general based on the account of mixed 
quotation proposed in Maier (2014a). I assume, without going into details, that the account is 
also applicable, perhaps after slight modifications, to pure quotation. 
4  Thanks for an anonymous reviewer for bringing this reference to my attention.  
. .smart( , )i ee x x eλ λ
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subsection, obtaining a syntactic structure that allows this sort of double 
interpretation is challenging for the current Minimalist syntax. 
 
2.2. Double interpretation as a technical challenge 
 
In the previous subsection I suggested that the effect that at first sight resembles 
the problem of attitudes in reporting clauses arises from an entirely different 
syntactic structure. In the present subsection I discuss some technical details of 
the structure in question and show how challenging it may become for the 
general architecture of grammar. 
The core of the problem lies in the fact that it is simply not the case that the 
operation of enquotation is defined on standard lexical items. Put differently, it 
is incorrect to assume, as Tarski (1933) did, that what is flanked by quotes is a 
standard expression having its own extensional meaning. There are at least two 
independent pieces of evidence supporting this view: one empirical and one 
conceptual. 
The empirical argument is very simple: the material flanked by quotes, more 
often than not, has no lexical meaning assigned whatsoever. It can simply be a 
string that, without being stored in the lexicon as a separate item, can be used 
only in the quotational mode. This actually is a universal and powerful property 
of quotation, enabling making reference to expressions that are meaningless, 
often just to state this very fact, as in (7): 
 
(7) 
a. ‘Eckullectic’ is not an English expression. 
 
This effect naturally extends to the reconstruction of ellipsis. Take (8) below: 
 
(8)  
Bush said ‘I’ve got an eckullectic reading list.’, and I think he really does Δ. 
Δ1 = ‘have got an eckullectic reading list’ 
Δ2 = have got an ‘eckullectic’ reading list 
*Δ3 = have got an eckullectic reading list 
 
Obviously, eckullectic, functioning solely as a Bushism and not present in 
standard English, can be reconstructed only as a quotational phrase, reading 
roughly as ‘eckullectic’ in the sense of Bush. But there is little sense in saying 
that quotes turn a lexical item eckullectic into quotational expression 
‘eckullectic’, simply because there is no lexical item eckullectic. 
The conceptual argument comes from phases. As shown in (2) and 
commented right below, pure quotation is an island for movement. If, on the 
other hand, we stick firmly to the Minimalist picture in assuming no other 
account of islandhood than that based on Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC, 
cf. Chomsky (2000) and the related work), it follows that quotational 
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expressions should correspond to single phases. This, however, is not a 
technically trivial problem. Without going into detailed discussion (for various 
technical and conceptual aspects, see Wiślicki [2016a]), I focus here on one 
problem rooted in the notion of formal features. That is, there are at least two 
views on Spell Out observable in the current Phase Theory (cf. Grano, Lasnik 
[2015] for a recent comparison). According to the first, assumed and argued for 
in Chomsky (2008, 2013a, 2015b), phases are defined rigidly on particular 
heads, most standardly v* and C0, sometimes also D0. According to another (cf. 
Wurmbrand [2013, 2016], Alexiadou et al. [2014]), the convergence-based 
approach, phases are defined in a dynamic way, Spell Out taking place when the 
full domain (standardly the event domain and the discourse domain) are formed. 
However, what is crucial for both of them is that they make use of the same 
mechanism of feature valuation triggering Spell Out. What is being shipped off 
to the interface – the phase complement – is a complete SO, that is the one 
whose all formal features have been valued. 
Let us then assume that quotation indeed corresponds to phases. Assuming 
the feature-based approach to phases it follows that there is some feature F that 
remains unvalued during the derivation of the quoting inside. Let, then, F stand 
for the general mode of utterance, say a sort of more fine-grained [FORCE] 
normally appearing in the Left Periphery. [-F] becomes valued together with the 
merger of the exponent of quotation (most standardly quotes), resulting in the 
following general structure5: 
 
(9) 
        β[+F:quot] 
 
   
‘…’ [-F] → [+F:quot]  α[-F]    valuation of [-F] into [+F:quot]  
and Spell Out of α 
 
 
     
 
So far, so good. On the one hand, quotation is given an atomic reading in terms 
of phases, which secures its islandhood and, under the proper formulation of 
semantics, its lack of straightforward compositionality. On the other hand, it 
opens up a promising way for accounting for the effects presented in (4) and (8). 
Note that, though a number of technical and conceptual loose ends remain, in 
this view ellipsis targets an expression underspecified with regard to the mode it 
is uttered in. Crucially, if the quotational mode is not imposed on the lexical 
                                                          
5  I leave aside the detailed discussion on the syntactic status of quotes, the problem being mostly 
irrelevant for the present paper. For some aspects of this non-trivial problem, see Wiese 
(1996), Ackema, Neeleman (2004), de Vries (2006), Maier (2014a), among others. 
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items entering the derivation, a path for reanalysis into the extensional mode 
remains, at least, unclosed. 
Still, the apparatus has to face different problems. Note that the operation of 
enquotation works in a recursive fashion, being straightforwardly definable on 
the output of some previous application of the same operation. Such a recursive 
use of quotes yields the embedding of quotations, which, as shown in (10), 
affects such mechanisms as binding: 
 
(10)  
a. Alfred1 said that I*1/2 was smart. 
b. Alfred1 said ‘I1/*2 am smart.’. 
c. Alfred1 said (quoting Rudolf2) ‘ ‘I*1/2 am smart.’ ’. 
 
However, while such a recursive use is a fact, it can hardly be formalised along 
the lines of (9). The source of the problem lies in the mechanism of feature 
valuation. For an SO valuating some feature f to do its job, some different SO in 
its domain must contain the unvalued [-f]. However, let us have a look at (10c) 
derived as in (9). First, Merge builds I am smart with [-F] that waits for the 
exponent of quotes. The first operation of enquotation valuates [-F] and forms 
the single-quoted expression: 
 
(11) 
[β: [+F:quot] ‘…’[assign F:quot] [α: [-F] I am smart]] 
 
This step is fully legitimated: it forms an interpretable, well-formed expression 
β. Still, it is not the end of the required derivation; there is yet another operation 
of enquotation to be applied. This can be easily achieved by yet another External 
Merge of the quoting marker. However, while we can say that due to Free Merge 
the structure is built without any problem, it hardly follows that the architecture 
of features works in the expected way. As stated above, each application of 
quotes should valuate the unvalued feature of its complement. However, 
contrary to (9) and (11), the second merger of quotes is not able to fulfil this 
role, simply because there is no item with unvalued [-F] in the domain of the 
outer quotes. Indeed, the situation is as follows: 
 
(12) 
[γ:? ‘…’[assign F:quot] [β: [+F:quot] ‘…’[assign F:quot] [α: [-F] I am smart]] 
 
In (12), the second application of quotes is supposed to valuate β. But β is 
already valued as [+F:quot] by the inner quotes. Thus valuation cannot take 
place when the outer quotes are merged. As a result, the recursive use of quotes 
remains unaccounted for in terms of feature valuation. The general sketch 
presented in (9), empirically supported by the lack of compositionality and 
islandhood, turns out to be insufficient. 
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The above problem supports, to some extent, the Richards-Chomsky 
argument (cf. Richards [2007, 2012]; Chomsky [2007, 2008]) of an alternating 
occurrence of phase and non-phase heads6. The argument, coming from feature 
inheritance, sheds some light on the present problem. Note that the complication 
arising for (12) could be easily avoided, had the outer quotes followed some 
head turning β’s [+F:quot] into [-F]. However, leaving aside a hardly minimalist 
character of such an underspecifying head, there is no clear empirical data 
supporting its postulation. Quite to the contrary. First, quotes seem to work in a 
perfectly recursive way without providing additional projections. Second, the 
potential underspecifying head would, in principle, open up a landing site for 
movement, despite the fact that movement from the embedded quotation is 
not possible7.  
As it stands, then, the standard Minimalist architecture of features meets 
certain empirical problem. First, there is a non-trivial problem with the quoting 
inside, whose lack of compositionality and islandhood should not remain 
unaccounted for. Second, the recursive use of quotes puts the problem in a new 
light, showing that the straightforward standard feature valuation does not work 




In this section I presented a particular combination of syntactic and semantic 
demands of quotational expressions. As shown in subsection 2.1, ellipses from 
quotation require the possibility of double interpretation: the extensional and the 
quotational one, together with some way of filtering out those expressions that 
are not possible for the former reading. This would suggest that there are proper 
levels of syntactic representation which, when targeted by ellipsis, enable both 
interpretations. However, when moved to the Narrow Syntax, quotation seems to 
pose problems that are by no means trivial for the standard Minimalist apparatus. 
On the one hand, quotation is expected to be treated as an atom, mainly for the 
lack of compositionality and islandhood. On the other hand, the semantic 
complexity shown in the form of double interpretation conflicts with the alleged 
atomicity. While these phenomena seem to be accountable for by means of 
phases, that is if the quoting inside is said to posses some unvalued formal 
feature which is valued by quotes, the recursive use of quotes turns out to pose a 
                                                          
6  See also Larson (2015) for a different approach with similar results. 
7  An anonymous reviewer suggests that that kind of head could have been provided as a silent 
[v say]. However, there are at least three problems arising for this account. First, such a head, if 
conceived of in terms of Chomsky (2013, 2015b) would be a phase head, not a head. However, 
it is expected that it is quotes that stand for the crucial valuation, and what they need is a non-
phasal head enabling this procedure. Second, it is not at all clear how the machinery could deal 
with the fact that such a head remains silent at the SM, but relevant at the C-I interface. Third, 
it would project and thus affect labelling and create its edge area. However, both islandhood 
and mixed quotation seem to deliver a strong argument against such properties. 
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problem closely connected to the Richards-Chomsky requirement of the PH0- H0 
configuration. As it stands, the phase-character of quotation seems to escape the 
straightforward approach. Consequently, there is no clear way in which the 
semantic complexity could reasonably follow from the syntactic architecture.  
 
 
3. Quotational deviancy and ellipsis 
 
The double interpretation of quotational ellipsis as shortly discussed in section 2 
can be conceived of as a reflex of a deeper problem. In fact, the above data show 
that it is by no means clear what is the quoted and, accordingly, the elided 
material. Indeed, the syntactic behaviour of quotation shows that what forms the 
quoting inside cannot be conceived of as (a string of) lexical items. That is, 
under the standard approach, whatever is the operation of enquotation, its 
domain cannot be the lexicon. Moreover, assuming the Minimalist syntactic 
architecture, the phasal character of quotation (the lack of compositionality, 
islandhood) shows that the operation of enquotation must deal with formal 
features of the complement of quotes standing for the operation in question. It is 
not at all clear, however, what these formal features can actually be, not 
mentioning the problem of their interpretation. 
This problem is by no means trivial for the general analysis of ellipsis. Unless 
it is specified what is exactly flanked by quotes, it is impossible to state what 
undergoes ellipsis. The methodological consequence is rather serious: it is not 
clear how to formulate the Parallelism Condition for ellipsis, the core of any 
account of the phenomenon. Indeed, the problem looks even more seriously if 
we have a look at quite standard, well argued and very general assumptions 
regarding ellipsis observed in the recent literature; actually, neither of them 
covers all the effects arising for quotational ellipsis. 
Take an especially general condition, discussed most recently in Messick & 
Thoms (2016). According to it, parallelism domain must be semantically 
identical to another constituent AC [antecedent clause], modulo focus-marked 
constituents. The argument for this condition is obvious: we want the grammar 
to filter out cases like (13) below: 
 
(13) 
Peter saw London, and so did I Δ. 
#Δ = see Paris 
 
The first problem that immediately arises at this point is that of identity; it is far 
non-trivial what makes two expressions semantically identical. Assume, 
however, the simplest, most coarse-grained account, according to which two 
expressions e1 and e2 are semantically identical iff for every situation s, e1 and e2 
have the same truth value in s. It is clear that this approach can hardly explain 
some phenomena observable for quotational ellipsis. The simple reason is that 
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the quotational context, being a textbook example of non-compositional 
contexts, imposes different truth conditions than the standard extensional one. 
To illustrate, let us have a look at the following example: 
 
(14) 
Peter said ‘I live in London.’ and John confirmed that he really does Δ. 
Δ1 = live in London; Δ2 = ‘live in London’ 
 
While the assumed semantic identity holds for Δ2, it is no longer so for Δ1, 
because the truth conditions of live in London and ‘live in London’ are not 
identical. While the latter is true in every situation in which the speaker has 
uttered the string at hand, the former is true in every situation in which Peter 
lives in the capital of England (evaluated in the proper context).  
This simple fact shows that the special semantic behaviour of quotation may 
be problematic for the general theory of ellipsis. However, the problem goes 
even further. The special, non-compositional nature of quotes lies, among others, 
in that they legitimize ill-formed expressions, as mentioned in the context of (7)-
(8) above. What is especially interesting, however, is that this universal feature 




a. John said ‘This guy is smart.’, and I think he really is Δ. 
Δ1 = smart; Δ2 = ‘smart’ 
b. John said ‘This guy are smart.’. 
c. *John said ‘This guy are smart.’, and I think he really is Δ. 
Δ1 = smart; Δ2 = ‘smart’ 
 
(15a) is a standard quotational ellipsis. In (15b) the deviant expression in 
legitimized by quotes, thus becoming fully grammatical. Surprisingly, the stark 
deviancy arises together with the mixture of the two, that is the quotes-
legitimized deviancy and ellipsis, as shown in (15c). And what is new with 
regard to (14) is that here the quotational character of the elided part fails to 
repair the whole expression.  
A very similar phenomenon is observable for sluicing. As argued for by 
Griffiths and Lipták (2014; see, again, Messick & Thoms (2016) for further 
arguments), variables in the antecedent and the ellipsis clause must be bound 
from parallel positions. While this works fine for quotational ellipses as a 
condition, it is clearly not enough to explain their special behaviour. Have a look 
at the following examples. For simple sluicing, where all the phrases are 
grammatical as in (16), no problem arises whatsoever.  
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(16) 
John said ‘I want to give you something.’, but I don’t know what1 Δ  
Δ = he wants to give me t1 
 
Take, however, (17b), clearly deviant despite the grammatical character of (17a): 
 
(17) 
a. John said ‘I want to give you a something.’. 
b. *John said ‘I want to give you a something.’, but I don’t know what1 Δ  
Δ = he wants to give me t1 
 
The situation is similar to (15). The whole clause (17a) including the antecedent 
is perfectly fine. So is binding in terms of the above condition. It is then not at 
all clear why the deviant expression justified by quotes does not allow ellipsis in 
(17b).  
What connects all the above examples is that certain problems for ellipsis 
arise even if all the standard conditions seem to be met. The deviant character of 
the quoted expression, once neutralized by quotes, again comes into play when 
quotation is targeted by ellipsis. This happens despite the fact that neither the 
deviant expression appears in the elided part, nor is any syntactic condition (as 
the one for binding) violated.  
The intuitive conclusion is that it is the problem of access into the quoting 
inside, necessary for ellipsis to be possible, that is especially problematic and, so 
far, unexplored. On the one hand, the quoting inside must be accessed in the 
process of reconstructing ellipsis in such a way that its deviancy affects the 
ellipsis as such. On the other hand, however, the possibility of such an access 
must go in tandem with the semantic insensitivity to the deviant character of the 




4. Recursive typing and the Minimalist syntax 
 
In this section I shall offer a new way of dealing with the data discussed above. 
The material, however, is quite demanding. First, we want quotation to be 
Spelled Out as a single phase complement, covering its typically phasal 
character (cf. section 1). Moreover, we want this to work in a recursive fashion, 
allowing to compute subsequent name-formation operations (cf. subsection 2.2). 
Second, we want the machinery to allow the access to the quotational and 
disquotational reading of the quoted inside (cf. subsection 2.1). Accordingly, the 
grammar is expected both to allow ill-formed expressions within quotes and to 
explain how the legitimized ungrammatical material affects ellipsis (cf. 
section 3). 
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The idea is to bridge one basic assumption of the Minimalist syntax, that is 
cyclic Spell Out working under feature valuation, and the Curry-Church heritage 
in the form of recursive typing. As I shall try to show, the expected effects can 
be accounted for under the proper connection between syntactic features and 
semantic typing, the latter being the interpretation of the former, taking place at 
the interface. In subsection 4.1 I present a fragment of the machinery that 
generates the expected effects, showing its close connection to some previous 
works on type-shifting. In subsection 4.2 I test the machinery by showing how it 
derives quotational expressions. As it is also shown, the data support rethinking 
the feature valuation mechanism. In section 4.3 I show how the data discussed in 
sections 1-2 look in light of the proposed modifications. 
 
4.1. Typing at the interface 
 
The very fact that ellipsis involves non-trivial semantic modifications w.r.t. the 
antecedent part is by no means limited to quotation. The relevant observations 
have been recently made by Barros (2016), who argues that cases like (18) 
below allow at least two interpretations: 
 
(18)   
Peter said he had seen someone1, but I didn’t hear who1 Δ  
Δ1 = Peter said he had seen; Δ2 = it was 
 
An additional argument, given in Barros and Vicente (2016), comes from 
pseudosluicing (example (13) in Barros and Vicente [2016]): 
 
(19)  
Sally has a new boyfriend, guess who Δ! 
*Δ1 = Sally has; Δ2 = it is 
 
If these arguments are sound, then the observations interestingly extend into 
intensional contexts. To illustrate, take (20) below: 
 
(20)  
Peter believes he saw someone1, but I don’t know who1 Δ 
Δ1 = Peter believes he saw; Δ2 = it was 
 
Contrary to (18), in (20) ellipsis in both interpretations involves belief-context 
shifts. For Δ1 the elided part is reconstructed to the form of one belief-context 
(Peter’s beliefs) embedded in another (speaker’s knowledge). For the second 
possibility no belief-embedding arises whatsoever, Δ2 being a purely extensional 
phrase. 
Now while these examples do not necessarily involve typing, it is clear that 
the semantic interface cannot be completely blind for the effects at hand. And 
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quotation, I believe, shows that the problem is more significant than it first 
seems to be. The reason is that the operation of enquotation changes the 
ontological status of the arguments it is defined on. Making reference to 
someone’s utterance dog by means of ‘dog’, we obviously do not want our 
quotational expression to pick out a real barking object, but a particular string, 
which indeed may itself refer to the barking entity. And since it is types that 
standardly stand for such a categorization, it does not come as a surprise that this 
way of thinking about quotation has already been developed. The proponent of 
this strategy is Potts (2007, see also Maier (2014b) for some relevant 
comments), who argues that quotational expressions are assigned different type 
– u(tterance). 
In this paper I propose to pursue this approach, going a few steps further. 
That is, I assume that quotational expressions have the dedicated type, call it u, 
together with the truth conditions tq, conceived of along the general lines of 
Maier (2014a)8. However, contrary to Potts (2007), I do not assume the 
existence of typed expressions in the lexicon and, accordingly, in the derivation. 
Rather, I take typing to be a function, a part of the semantic interface, mapping 
the syntactic information onto proper types. Therefore I am moving closer to the 
dynamic approach to types dating back to the idea of type-shifting (cf. Partee, 
Roth [1983] and much related work). In particular, I draw on Chierchia’s (1998, 
most recently adapted to argument ellipsis by Bošković [2016]) idea according 
to which NPs undergo type-shifting from et into e when they are turned into 
arguments. What is crucial for the present purpose is that, when taken at some 
higher level of abstraction, in this view it is type-shifting that stands for the far 
non-trivial switch from a syntactic constituent into an argument – the domain of 
semantics. I take up the idea in treating Spell Out (Transfer) as involving a 





Typing is a C-I interface operation T which for every output α of the Narrow 
Syntax derivation is defined as T:<Lα,FRCα>→MR(σ), Lα a label of α, FRCα a 
syntactic feature standing for the force of α, M a lambda term, R(σ) a type 
constant. 
 
That is, according to the present view, items entering the derivation are untyped. 
However, some of them – those providing features standing for labels and force 
(treated as something close to F in (9), in a more fine-grained way than just the 
left periphery head Force0) – deliver information that is interpreted at the 
                                                          
8  I leave aside the problem of whether these are entirely different types or just subtypes of a 
more general type e and t (see Wiślicki [2016b] for the latter approach and Luo [2010, 2012], 
Asher [2015] for the extended work on subtypes). 
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interface in the form of proper typing operation. Note also that typing as defined 
here is recursive, meaning that the apparatus is able to retype an already typed 
expression. Actually, σ  is not defined as a variable. The only constraint is that 
( )R σ  is a constant, which guarantees that typing is not a referentially vacuous 
step, where no type-constant (and thus ontological categorization) is assigned. 
It is also worth pointing out that (21) is in accord with what Chomsky 
(2015b) says about the labelling algorithm and the general ontology of labels: 
 
Since (…) labeling is required at CI and for the process of externalization (though not at 
SM, which has no relevant structure), it must take place at the phase level, as part of the 
Transfer operation. Crucially, LA [Labelling Algorithm – JW] does not yield a new 
category as has been assumed in PSG and its various descendants, including X’ theory. 
Under LA, there is no structure [α X], where α is the label of X. LA simply determines a 
property of X for externalization and CI.  
(Chomsky (2015b:6); bolding mine – JW) 
 
(21) in fact goes towards Chomsky’s idea; it outlines the way labels can be 
required by semantic interpretation. Without labels the interface is not able to 
yield a typed lambda-term. An untyped lambda term, on the other hand, is 
semantically vacuous, providing no ontological categorization whatsoever.  
What is new w.r.t. Chomsky’s system is the presence of a more fine-grained 
counterpart of Force (called here FRC)9. That is, it is proposed that Narrow 
Syntax provides additional items driving the relevant part of semantic 
computation, labels alone not being able to guarantee the proper typing at the 
interface. And there are at least three arguments supporting this approach. First 
of all, there is simply no one-to-one relation between a label and the ontological 
category represented by a given type. Bare ‘NP’ – the information provided by 
the label – is not in a position to secure the proper typing, because nominals 
represent various categories (individuals, utterances, functions over types, etc.). 
Second, there are operations that, within the present framework, affect typing 
while working in a perfectly recursive way. Enquotation is an especially clear 
(recall the discussion in subsect. 2.2), but not the only possible candidate (think, 
for instance, of a recursive way of forming proper names: a proper name of an 
object, a proper name of the proper name, etc.). On the other hand, if we follow 
the quite standard assumption according to which it is syntax that is responsible 
for linguistic recursion, then the presence of items providing FRC within the 
Narrow Syntax is fully legitimized. Finally, the above account pushes the overall 
architecture closer to the general Minimalist idea of linguistic computation 
expressed in Chomsky (2013b). According to the view, there is no semantics 
                                                          
9  This, however, is not incompatible with Chomsky’s view. Note that he does not exclude the 
possibility that labelling is a part of information required by C-I. It is also worth pointing out 
that in his earlier account, Chomsky (1995: 292) explicitly states that the force indicator 
(located, as standardly, in C) is indispensable for interpretation, thus always present, 
sometimes covertly. 
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proper, the seemingly semantic computation falling under syntax – the only 
mechanism of linguistic computation independent from the use of language. It is 
syntax, the mechanism responsible for the internal symbol manipulation, that is 
supposed to do all the use-independent work. Now while it is far from obvious 
how a number of non-trivial operations standardly taking place in the semantic 
computation (β, η-raductions, substitution, changing bound variables, to itemize 
the most significant examples) could be defined within the Narrow Syntax, there 
is a less radical way. The semantic operations could simply follow, possibly 
unequivocally, from the structure built within the derivation. And this is exactly 
supposed to be the case in (21): it is the semantic interface that types lambda-
terms (the simplest Merge having different purposes and nature), but typing is no 
more than an interpretation of syntactic information – a necessary but also an 
automatic one. 
 
4.2. Typing and quotation 
 
In the previous subsection I defined typing as an interface operation, which is 
supposed to shed some new light on the puzzling problems outlined in sections 
1-3. However, before I move directly to the problematic issues, I shall have a 
closer look at how the proposed account allows to derive and compute 
quotational expressions. 
To see how this works, take some simple example, like (22) below: 
 
(22)  
Alfred said ‘Rudolf likes dogs.’. 
 
First, we derive the quoting inside as a standard CP. Therefore, we expect Rudolf 
likes dogs to be interpreted as something like (23), irrelevant details omitted: 
 
(23)  
λei.λye.λxe.Rudolf (xe,ei) & dogs (ye,ei) & likes (xe,ye,ei) & PRESENT (ei) = 1  
iff Rudolf likes dogs in ei 
 
This means that each of the relevant constituents must obtain force (the FRC 
feature) allowing the standard extensional interpretation (type e, i, and the truth 
conditions). Call it FRCext; I leave aside the detailed discussion on such a 
standard typing. I assume that the constituents providing these features are 
adjoined to the highest heads within the relevant domains, resulting in complex 
heads (in a simplest version, assuming the pair-Merge approach, these are 
<FRCext,Num0> for dogs and Rudolf, <FRCext,<√like,v*>> for like and 
<FRCext,T0> for PRESENT)10. Let, then, force be specified within such complex 
                                                          
10  The exact nature of such complex heads can be conceived of in many ways. See Piggott, 
Travis (2013), Kupula Roos (2016), and references therein for some relevant discussion. 
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heads and the rest of derivation proceed standardly (with phases on v* and C or 
everywhere else where all formal features are valued), so that the semantic 
computation is able to yield (23). 
So, at the CP level, the semantic interface receives a full-fledged phrase, with 
all the formal features being valued. The question is what happens next, that is 
when the CP is merged with quotes. I propose that as a result of such a merger, 
the adjoined quotes target the FRC features of the CP, that is: 
 
(24) 
CP ‘Rudolf likes dogs’ 
 
 




Still, the problem that immediately arises at this point is the operation of FRC 
valuation, turning FRCext into FRCquot, already signalised is subsection 2.2. As 
known, within the standard valuation, based on the Probe-Goal relation, a 
feature [F] undergoes valuation from [-F] to some[+F:i]. The valued feature 
becomes then invisible for the Probe-Goal mechanism. Under such an approach, 
anything like (24) is, of course, impossible. However, I propose a generalized 
view on feature valuation which, I argue, is exactly what is supported by the data 
observable for quotational ellipsis and the recursive character of Narrow Syntax. 




 Let a feature [F] be a set {[-F],[+F:i],[+F:j],…,[+F:n]},[+F:k]∈[F],i≤k≤n. 
 Feature valuation is a function FV :[F]→[F]\{[-F]}  
 
That is, I propose to treat the unvalued feature [-F] as a special case of what is 
called a feature [F]. It is special because it marks syntactic terminals or, 
following a broader view of Chomsky (2015a: 81), who does take the problem 
of assuming unvalued features to be serious and puzzling, because it enables 
cyclicity, required for any efficient computation. It is also special because, under 
substantial, non-vacuous valuation, it cannot be the output of the operation FV. 
Still, in the truly recursive machinery the Narrow Syntax is supposed to be, the 
constraint blocking mappings between ‘valued’ features (revaluation) is an 
unwanted stipulation, which must be empirically justified. 
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However, what the analysis of the present data shows is just the contrary: 
revaluation is not only allowed11, but also necessary. Let us first get back to (24). 
At the level of the lower CP, the phrase has all its features (including FRC) 
valued, and thus it undergoes Spell Out. The merger of quotes triggers feature 
valuation of FRC, allowed under (25). As a result, the FRC feature undergoes 
revaluation. However, since no new unvalued features have been added, the 
upper CP has a complete feature set up. This, on the other hand, automatically 
triggers Spell Out. The C-I interface receives, among others, information about 
the label (CP) and force (FRCquot). The typing machinery maps this information 
onto the proper lambda term along the lines of (21), resulting in something like 
(26) below (irrelevant details omitted): 
 
(26)  
λeiq.λyu.λxu.Rudolf(xu,eiq)&dogs(yu,eiq)&likes(xu,yu, eiq)&PRESENT (eiq) = 1  
iff p in eiq, where p is what the speaker s means by Rudolf likes dogs 
 
There are two immediate consequences of this sort of approach, both plausible. 
First, the proposed machinery Spells Out quotational expressions as single 
chunks – an effect expected for the sake of the phasal character of such 
expressions (recall the discussion is section 1). Second, note that under (25), 
recursive enquotation is no longer problematic, contrary to (11)-(12). The inner 
quotation can simply undergo yet another enquotation, the recursive valuation 
followed by the recursive typing being its formal reflex. In this regard it is not 
substantially different from (24). 




Alfred said ‘Rudolf like dogs.’ 
 
Assume a derivation as in (24). What would be the result of applying the above 
machinery to quoted deviant expressions. Indeed, the improper agreement 
between v*+V and the subject results in the ill-formed expression. If we follow 
                                                          
11  An anonymous reviewer raises the question of critierial position and the connected freezing 
effect, arguing that if we allow the revaluation mechanism, there would be no way for filtering 
out examples like *Which chocolate do you wonder John ate?. Indeed, these ideas might look 
differently within the present framework. However, two comments are in order at this point. 
First, revaluation neither dispenses with [-F], nor questions its special character. Rather, it 
brings attention to the valuation mechanism, which, in principle, should work in a truly 
recursive way. Second, these objections are problematic only insofar as we assume anything 
like freezing effect to be present in the Narrow Syntax. However, its legitimacy was 
questioned in Chomsky (2015b) as problematic for SMT. The recent framework of Chomsky 
(2015b) shows a way for overcoming this problem, identifying the problem in labelling (see 
especially p. 13, ft. 16). 
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the general line of crash-proof grammar argued for in Frampton, Gutmann (2002 
and the related work), then indeed the whole derivation crashes at the lower CP, 
before the quotational level is reached. Within this framework, the proposed 
machinery does not work. However, if we follow the recent view of Chomsky 
(2014b), there is no crash proper, understood as the GB-era crash taking place 
before Spell Out (or LF). Rather, the Narrow Syntax releases into interfaces 
expressions that may appear to be interpretationally deviant, some more, others 
less12.  
How this fares for the present machinery? Note that the recursive typing 
opens up a new way for Chomsky’s relaxed approach to deviancy mentioned 
above. Namely, the recursive typing machinery allows the whole apparatus to 
compute a deviant expression, and then retype it to the form where it is fully 
acceptable. And this is exactly what we need for deviant quotation. At the level 
of lower CP the semantic interface would form the deviant expression, with the 
incorrect form of the verb. However, thanks to the recursive typing, the ill-
formed expression would be retyped in the relevant way after the merger of 
quotes, which legitimizes the ungrammatical quoting inside. In this sense the 
recursive typing could be conceived of as tampering with the already computed 
expression, against the No Tampering Condition. However, leaving aside 
whether this really violates NTC (actually, the retyped expressions is the third 
product, composed of the initial expression and quotes), it is worth pointing out 
that the rule, while strongly required within the Narrow Syntax, may be arguably 
unwanted at the interfaces (cf. Takita, Goto, Shibata [2016] for more general 
arguments)13. What is crucial for our purpose, however, is that thanks to this 
approach, we have a cake and eat it. That is, at one stage of derivation, the 
Narrow Syntax produces a standard expression – either grammatical or not. At 
the higher stage, it reforms the same expression by means of quotes, yielding all 
the expected effects that are characteristic for quotation. In the following 
subsection I shall show that the data from quotational ellipsis strongly support 
the proposed approach. 
 
4.3. Quotational ellipsis: double interpretation and deviant antecedents 
 
Assuming the above framework, let us now move back to our two core empirical 
problems arising for quotational ellipsis, that is the double interpretation and the 
                                                          
12  The view is in harmony with the abovementioned Thesis T of Chomsky (2014a), and actually 
restates an even earlier thought: [the expressions] are sometimes called “deviant”, but that is 
only an informal notion. (…) The only empirical requirement is that SM and C-I assign the 
interpretations that the expression actually has, including many varieties of “deviance”. 
(Chomsky 2008:144)  
13  Note that, strictly speaking, all the reductions defined on lambda-terms violate NTC, which 
shows not only that NTC is dispensable but also unwanted as an interface constraint. See 
Jakielaszek (2011) for the relevant discussion. 
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unexpected effects rooted in antecedents in quoted deviant expressions. Take (4) 
repeated below as (28): 
 
(28)  
Scenario: Tarski uses the adjective smart to describe only those persons who are 
good mathematicians and have made a substantial fortune. 
Tarski said ‘Peter is smart.’, but I’m not sure whether he really is Δ. 
Δ1 = smart; Δ2 = ‘smart’ 
 
The two possible Δs stand for two substantially different interpretations. To 
cover this effect, the Narrow Syntax should yield two structures: one standing 
for the extensional, another for the quotational reading. However, this is exactly 
what is secured by the proposed machinery. Leaving aside some details that are 
irrelevant for the present purpose, the derivation would be as follows: 
 
(29) Tarski said: 
          CP2 ‘Peter is smart’ 
 
 
     ‘...’             →             CP1 Peter is smart:  
               FRC valuation 
          
  
 where:   
for CP1: λei.λxe ….smart(xe,ei)=1 
iff … x is smart in e 
for CP2: λei.λxu ….smart(xu,ei)=1 
iff … x is f in e where f is 
what the speaker S meant by smart&Tarski(S) 
 
That is, no matter whether one takes ellipsis to target the syntactic structure per 
se or its interface interpretation (see Zwart [2013] for some relevant comments), 
there are exactly two possible antecedents for the ellipsis to be reconstructed 
from. If the reconstruction targets CP1, the result is the extensional reading Δ1; if 
it targets CP2, the right interpretation is Δ2. Thanks to the connection between 
the syntactic FRC valuation and typing, the two antecedents are available both in 
the Narrow Syntax and at the interface. 
Let us now move to a no less puzzling problem, that is the cases where 
ellipses are blocked by the deviant character of the quoting inside. As shortly 
discussed above, the unexpected problem with (30) is that no ellipsis is possible. 
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(30)  
*Alfred said ‘Rudolf like dogs.’, and I think he really does Δ. 
Δ1 = like dogs; Δ2 = ‘like dogs’ 
 
Let us chunk this into phases. First, the proposed machinery would derive the vP 
phase and Spell Out the complement dogs. No deviancy arises whatsoever. In 
the second step the interface would receive the product of the CP phase Rudolf 
like dogs, with the incorrect agreement. The phrase is considered ill-formed at 
the semantic interface. Finally, the merger of quotes is interpreted as a retyping 
operation, legitimizing ill-formed expressions by providing different ontological 
categorization marked by different types. What deserves special attention is the 
fact that the material from the ellipsis site has its first antecedent in the second 
phase, that is the ill-formed one. And the point here is that there are good 
arguments for taking this fact to be significant. As Sakamoto (2016) argues for, 
there is a strict correlation between ellipsis and phases: arguments in the ellipsis 
site must have the relevant antecedents in the first cycle that includes them. 
Though the present problem is slightly different, there is a striking analogy: it is 
exactly the first phase containing all the constituents present in the ellipsis site 
that is ill formed. And this provides a reasonable line of thinking: ellipsis is not 
possible if its antecedent is ill-formed at the first phase level. Or, put differently, 
ellipsis cannot be reconstructed from something that has been interpreted as 
ungrammatical, even if its ill-formedness appears only in the first phase and then 
disappears. This also solves the puzzling problem of the impossibility of Δ2 in 
(30). The quotational mode, which legitimizes any phrase, cannot rescue the 
ellipsis because the constraint comes from below: once Spelled Out as an ill-
formed expressions, the phrase fails to allow ellipsis, even though it is itself 




This section shows that the discussed effects arising for quotational ellipsis, viz. 
the double interpretation and the impossibility of ellipsis for deviant quoted 
expressions, can be accounted for by means of typing understood as an 
interpretation of the recursive feature valuation. The data from quotational 
expressions show that this way of rethinking standard feature valuation is 
necessary for the general syntax of quotation, and additionally supported by the 
double interpretation arising for ellipsis. The very double interpretation, 
however, follows from the dynamic approach to types, within which retyping an 
already typed lambda-term follows directly from the particular syntactic 
structure. In this regard it is cyclic Spell Out and the proposed interface effect 
(typing) that allows the expected effects. This fact goes in tandem with the 
puzzling problem of ellipsis blocked in the case of deviant quoted expressions, 
the observed effects being borne out under the proper approach to the scope of 
phases and its consequences.  
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5. Conclusion and future prospects 
 
In his recent paper, Maier (2016) argues that the additional operation of 
enquotation should be actually considered, even if not overtly manifested, in the 
semantic computation. What has been put into the present analysis goes in the 
opposite direction, namely what can be found when the operation of 
disquotation, required for the sake of the reconstruction of ellipsis, is applied. 
And the point is that this operation is by no means trivial. It has been shown that 
ellipses with quotational antecedents not only allow two distinct interpretations, 
but also show an interesting sensitivity to the character of the quoting inside. 
These effects, in turn, show that the traditional view, dating back to the seminal 
works of Tarski and Geach, according to which the material flanked by quotes is 
syntactically inactive, must be reconsidered. This, however, turned out to be a 
challenging problem, mainly due to the widely-accepted feature valuation 
system. The paper offered a way out by suggesting a new approach to feature 
valuation and typing machinery. In this regard, its purely theoretical contribution 
is three-fold. First, it opens up a new way of looking at the architecture of 
features by letting the feature valuation mechanism work in a truly recursive 
way. Second, it sketches a way of setting up a formal connection between the 
Narrow Syntax and the semantic interface. The connection is conceived of in 
terms of mapping from syntactic features onto semantic types, so that the latter 
do not have to be assumed to be already present in the lexicon. Rather, types are 
derivable in the sense of being the output of interpretation of particular syntactic 
structures, and as such show a perfectly recursive behaviour in the form of 
retyping. Third, the paper shows a more fine-grained approach to Force, arguing 
for its special behaviour, remarkably different from the rest of the Left Periphery 
heads. On empirical grounds, I have scratched the surface of quotational ellipsis 
– an apparently unexplored area, in spite of the first steps dating back more than 
40 years ago. Consequently, the paper opens up at least two paths for future 
research: the theoretical one, concerning the recursive feature valuation and its 
connection to the interface effects, as well as the empirical one, deepening our 
understanding of subsequent effects arising for quotational ellipsis and the 
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